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ABSTRACT: The year 2022 will probably mark 
the end of the German nuclear age. Nevertheless 
the question of how to secure the transport of 
nuclear energy material will remain relevant for 
an indefinite period of time: neither does the 
Federal Republic of Germany have final 
repository nor is it building one. The transport of 
nuclear material includes a high number of risk 
factors, e.g. terror threats and the risk of natural 
disasters. The article analyses the specific case 
of the German nuclear policy by looking at the 
past and current situation and by taking future 
developments into account. 
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Introduction 
The use of nuclear energy, the transport of radioactive 
material and especially the question of how to find a final 
repository for nuclear waste isa frequently discussed 
issuein German media, society and the political debate.  
The discourse started together with the anti-nuclear-
movement in the 1970s and led to the foundation of the 
German Green Party (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen) in 1980. 
The Greens, which first were seen as a short-term 
interlude, soon became an established player in the 




































 of Chancellor Gerhard Schröder (SPD) in 1998. The 
Atomic Energy Act of January 2, 2002 marked the 
starting point of a gradual nuclear phase out without 
specifying a definitive date.  
In 2010, Schröder’s successor Angela Merkel (CDU) 
pushed towards an extension of the operational life 
spans for nuclear power plants by passing the 
amendment of the German Atomic Energy Act. 
Nevertheless, in March 2011 the Federal government of 
Chancellor Merkel did the most significant step towards 
the post-nuclear age: Only a few days after the 
Fukushima nuclear disaster in Japan, the Federal 
Government pledged the nuclear phase put by the end of 
2022. In the following months, eight out of seventeen 
German nuclear reactors were permanently shut down 
without causing an energy crisis, as critics of this policy 
had predicted it. Surveys showed that the announcement 
of a nuclear phase out was backed by a large majority of 
the German society: according to the polls of the ZDF-
network from April 2011, 72 % of the Germans supported 
a fast exit from nuclear technology.  
But even so the Federal Republic of Germany will most 
likely reach thisstated goal and shut down the last 
nuclear power plant in 2022, the question of how to 
secure the carriage of castor container and nuclear 
energy materials is not going to disappear simultaneously 
due to following reasons:  
(1) Nowadays 26 German castor containers with 
high-radioactive nuclear waste are still stored in 
the nuclear fuel reprocessing plant of La Hague 
in France and Sellafield in GreatBritain, which 
have to be returned to Germany over the next 
few years.  
(2) The remaining reactors in Germany are 
producing about 250 t of spent fuel elements 
each year. This high-risk waste has to be brought 
to one of the interim storage facility.  
(3) So far, the Federal Republic of Germany does 
not have a final repository at its disposal nor are 
there concrete plans to build one, even so the 
discussion started as early as in the 1980s. Due 
to these circumstances, each of the nowadays 
existing castor containers, which are stored now 











































. Gorleben, Ahaus and others, have to be 
transferred to a final repository in the near or far 
future.  This actually may take more than a while. 
According to the assessment of Michael Müller, 
Chairman of the “Commission for the disposal of 
high-level radioactive waste” at the German 
Parliament, the search for such a facility will last 
at least until the year 2170. 
It is for this reason that efficient concepts for a safe and 
secured transportation of castor containers are deeply 
required and won’t lose their relevance after the German 
nuclear phase out in 2022. 
In principle, the transportation of nuclear material and 
radioactive waste is an every day business in Germany. 
According to the Federal Ministry of Transport, about 
800.000 radioactive packages are shipped between two 
spots each year. However, the high majority of those 
elements belongs to the sector of low-level or medium-
level nuclear material and are by-products e.g. of nuclear 
technology, nuclear fission, research and medicine.  
Only less then 10% of the transports is to be defined as 
high-level radioactive material and most of them don’t 
take place on public transportation routes but only within 
the power plant’s facility. 
 
Risks and challenges of castor transports: The German Case 
High-level radioactive material are mainly generated in 
the reactor core, e.g., spent fuels,  and include more than 
99% of the total radioactivity which is produced during 
the nuclear power process. For this reason it requires a 
special radiation shielding during usage and transport. In 
Germany, high-level nuclear material is only transported 
in Castor Containers1, a trademarked brand of dry casks 
used to store spent nuclear fuels and other high-level 
radioactive waste for a certain amount of time, before it is 
transferred to a final repository.Castor containers are 
manufactured by GNS, a German provider for nuclear 
services. In the long run, the Castor containers have to 
be replaced by other receptacles, since they are not 
suitable for a permanent disposal, which would last at 
least 100.000 up to 1.000.000 years. 
                     


































 The responsibility for the transportation of high-level 
radioactive material lies with the German Federal Office 
for Radiation Protection, which gives the authorization for 
transportations of Castor containers.  
The transportation of high-level radioactive material 
includes a number of risk factors:  
The risk of transportation: Critics claim the high risk of 
castor transportation due to the defective quality of the 
container’s material. Although safety tests proved that 
Castor container could resist a heat of 800 degrees for 
more then 30 minutes, this might not be enough in 
several possible real-life scenarios. A major traffic crash 
during the transport could cause a fire with much higher 
temperatures: for example during an accident in the Mont 
Blanc Tunnel in 1999, burning trucks caused a fire of 
more than 1.200 degrees which lasted for several hours. 
It took more than five days before the tunnel cooled 
sufficiently to start repairs. Until today, no tests have 
shown that a Castor container could survive such an 
accident unscathed. 
The risk of terror attacks: The risk of terror attacks is 
hardly taken into consideration within the German debate 
regarding castor transportation, even so acts of 
sabotage, e.g. damaging the railway line or power lines 
and blocking access roads, are part of nearly every 
castor transport since 1995. However, those acts are 
performed by anti-nuclear activists, who don’t intend to 
damage the containers seriously butwant to slow down or 
stop the transportation. 
Indeed, during the long-distance transportation, the 
castor containers are travelling partly through difficult to 
monitor remote areas and forests, before they reach their 
destination. A full protection cannot be guaranteed during 
this time and the containers becoming easy targets for 
potential terror attacks. For example, expert opinions 
showed that castor containers would suffer serious 
damage in case of being hit by an anti-tank missile or 
similar transportable weapons. Anti-terror concepts to 
secure castor transportation are not very advanced. 
Protection is mainly maintained by a growing number of 
police and security officials, who are escorting the 
transports.  
Even so the route of a castor transport is never published 











































. transport is taking because the streets and railway roads, 
which can be used for such a venture, are limited. Unlike 
in France, the German law does not formally forbid the 
advanced release of the castor containers’ travel route. 
Emerging of radiation: The risk of castor containers lies 
not only in traffic accidents and potential terrorist attacks. 
Also human failures, e.g. during the preparation of the 
containers, material weakness or material fluctuations 
and natural disasters as earth-quakes are high risk 
factors which could cause a leak of radiation and 
endanger the security guards, the demonstrators and the 
environment.Emerging radiation is a serious threat and 
can be caused by a number of unpredictable factors. 
The question of democracy: Beside those risk factors, 
another aspect has to be taken into consideration 
regarding castor transportations: the acceptance or not-
acceptance of those transports within the population and 
civil society.  
The German opposition towards the use of nuclear 
energy and the transport of nuclear material and its 
storage in interim facilities has always been strong and 
neither new technology, different government’s policy 
approaches or a generational change caused a change 
of mind within the German society. The anti-nuclear-
movement is one most persistent German grass-root-
movements, which are influential both on the local and 
national level. For the government this means a 
continuous balancing act: the castor containers with the 
nuclear waste have to be brought to interim storage 
facilities, but the loud voice of civil society can not be 
completely ignored. 
The German opposition towards the use of nuclear 
energy and especially the establish-ment of an interim or 
even final repository has been highly strong since the 
early beginning. The northern German town Gorleben 
played a key role in that movement and became famous 
both nationally and internationally because of the 
populations constant fight against the plans to establish a 
deep geological repository for radioactive waste along 
with interim storage units. 
The above ground cask storage site for Castor containers 
in Gorleben was already com-plated in 1983 but it took 




































 due to a number of lawsuits, which tried to prevent this 
development. 
The first transport of Castor containers, which arrived in 
Gorleben on April 25, 1995, caused large protests and 
resistance among local residents. In the weeks ahead, 
protesters damaged the railway line between Lüneburg 
and the final loading station of Danneberg and tried to 
dismantle parts of the tracks. Altogether about 15.000 
police officers and officials of the German Federal Border 
Police secured the transport. In Danneberg, the 
containers were loaded on trucks to be carried 18 
kilometers to their final destination in Gorleben. Due to 
large protests and roadblocks, it took more than five 
hours before the castor containers arrived at interim 
storage facility. 
This procedure did not change during the following years. 
In March 1997 the third castor transport to Gorleben was 
guarded by about 30.000 police officers and 10.000 pro-
testers who tried preventing the containers from arriving 
at the interim storage facility by using burning straw 
bales, road blockings and sit-ins. The expenditures were 
summed up to 18 Million DM, which did not include the 
large number of extra hours of the security staff. 
In 1998 the castor transports were stopped for several 
years until 2002 after it became known that a transport 
from La Hague exceeded the allowed value of 
radioactive substances. 
The 13th and so far last German Castor transport arrived 
in Gorleben in November 2011. It took more than five 
days for the containers to reach their final destination at 
the interim storage facility and marked a new negative 
all-time high in the history of German castor transports: 
the police proceeded with water cannons and pepper 
spray against the demonstrators; the protesters used 
fireworks and burning straw bales.133 policemen and 
355 protesters were injured, 27 tractors confiscated, 43 
protesters arrested. The total costs went up to 33,5 
Million € and caused protests of the state government of 
Lower-Saxony, which had to cover those bills. 
 
Conclusion 
By looking at the history of German Castor 











































. period of 20 years, nothing has changed. The transport 
of nuclear energy material, the use of interim storage 
facility or the establishment of a final repository are not 
accepted within the German society and led to huge 
protest movements. The arguments of the nuclear 
opponents are the same: the fear of long-term, 
irreversible health impairments and environmental 
damages due to uncontrollable nuclear radiation.  
Neither politics, new technology or security concepts nor 
a growing amount security forces could make the 
transport of Castor containers more acceptable within the 
Ger-man society, nor did the responsible officials find a 
way to make the transport of Castor containers faster, 
safer or cheaper. In fact, the opposite turned our to be 
the case: the transportation of castor containers became 
more expensive, took constantly more time and was 
unable to find a more efficient security concept, which 
would prevent opponents from damaging railway roads, 
blocking streets or climbing on the containers. 
Nevertheless, it is unquestionable that the produced 
nuclear waste has to be stored somewhere. The search 
for a final repository already started decades ago but did 
not led to any results yet. In general, Castor containers 
have to be stored in interim storages for at least 20 to 30 
year to cool down before they can be transferred to an 
underground facility. During this period, they are kept in 
aboveground interim storage facilities, e.g. in Gorleben, 
Ahahus and Nord-Lubmin. The interim storages are 
hardly secured. Radioactivity can easily be released, 
either due to a technical problem, a damaged container, 
an accident like a fire or an environmental disaster like an 
earthquake or a terror attack. Also with regard to the 
interim storage facilities, the question of how to prevent 
natural or human-made disaster is only raised since a 
few years.  
A long-term solution for the storage of the existing Castor 
containers is not yet found, even so the Federal 
Government encourages the search for a final repository. 
So far, Finland is the only country in the world that 
started to build a final repository for its high-radioactive 
nuclear waste.   
The search for a final repository is not only slowed down 
by the protest of the local population, who don’t want 




































 faces also a number of challenging criteria to guarantee a 
long-term safety:  
(1) Depending on the material, the storage need to be 
kept safe for 100.000 up to 1.000.000 years to store the 
material until it decays into non-radioactive material.  
(2) A strong and steady seismology has to be 
guaranteed during that period: the storage needs to be 
safe from earthquakes, intrusion of water or effects of the 
climate change. 
(3) The insulation capacity should not change during 
this period of time.  
(4) Also the risk of terror attacks and wars has to be 
taken into account.  
By looking back 100.000 years in human history, it is very 
obvious that 100.000 years are an amount of time where 
nothing could be guaranteed or excluded. 
What remains to say by looking at the German case? 
Most likely, the next Castor transport in Germany will 
arrive during 2016. There are no signs that the protest 
movement will decline and the up-coming Castor 
transport probably won’t differ from the previous one.  
The anti-nuclear movement in Germany is well 
established and can be found in nearly any social strata. 
Nevertheless, a final repository for high-radioactive waste 
is deeply required. To convince the population from this 
necessity and building confidence in the safety of new 
technology are one of the central tasks and challenges of 
the responsible companies and the government.  
Also the security concept of castor transport has to be 
reworked. The growing threat of terror attacks need to be 
taken into consideration to prevent irreparable damages. 
New security concepts might also help to gain trust within 
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